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KARL JASPERS: THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT
STUDY GUIDE, 1977
Steven Alan Samson
After the Second World War, the murderous events of the first half of the
twentieth century lent renewed energy to international efforts to define and
protect human rights. One contribution to this literature, which addressed the
question of the collective responsibility for the German people for the criminal
actions of their government, was a brief book simply entitled Die Schuldfrage
[The Guilt Question] by the German physician, psychiatrist, and existentialist
philosopher Karl Jaspers. Jaspers, whose wife was Jewish and who hid Jews
from the authorities, distinguished between four types of guilt:
Criminal guilt comes of violating unequivocal laws and is capable of
objective proof. Jurisdiction rests with the court.
Political guilt involves the deeds of statesmen and implicates the citizens
of a state for “having to bear the consequences of the deeds of the state whose
power governs [them] and under whose order [they] live.” Jurisdiction rests
with the power and will of the victor if the state should be defeated militarily. The
exercise of political prudence serves to mitigate arbitrary power.
Then there is moral guilt: “I, who cannot act otherwise than as an
individual, am morally responsible for all my deeds, including the execution of
political and military orders. It is never simply true that ‘orders are orders.’”
“Jurisdiction rests with my conscience, and in communication with my friends and
intimates who lovingly concerned about my soul.” This is why it is always
important to have wise counsel at hand.
Jaspers’ last category, metaphysical guilt, is a little more troubling if
taken to an extreme. It owes more to the Hindu concept of karma than to
Christianity to the extent it neglects to consider the irreducible reality of sin and
the crucial importance of divine forgiveness. But still it makes a sound point:
“There exists a solidarity among men as humans that makes each co-responsible
for every wrong and every injustice in the world [this confuses man the creature
with God], especially for crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge.
If I fail whatever I can do to prevent them, I too am guilty.”
This last point merits further consideration. It can easily lead to a
sanctimonious political moralism that has often been used to justify acts of
terrorism, such as the bombing of the federal office building in Oklahoma City or
the murder of an abortionist in Pensacola. It may also lead to a conception of
war as a crusade that requires unconditional surrender by the enemy. Among its
tools are the arts of guilt-manipulation, which are addressed at length by R. J.
Rushdoony (The Politics of Guilt and Pity), who squarely confronts the
temptations of self-atonement and scapegoating.
Often this kind of moralism substitutes a false idealism for the prudence or
compassion that would spare even an enemy from unnecessary harm. John
Brown’s use of terrorism against Southern settlers in the Pottawatomie Massacre
is just one of many examples. It has a psychological aspect – a sense of guilt by

association – that may cause us to abhor the consciousness of injustice in our
midst and seek to purge it by correcting it or, sometimes, by wreaking
vengeance. The American movie industry seems to specialize in fantasies
of retribution for guilty consciences.
Self-justification takes a variety of forms. Sometimes we are in a position
to act and regret that we did not do so sooner, like the high school student in
West Paducah, Kentucky who talked a school mate into surrendering his gun
after he had already killed three students. Such circumstances may cause
us to wrestle with our consciences and even lead us to unrealistically magnify our
own role or responsibility. We must remember that we are not all-seeing.
Sometimes we simply react to a crisis on the basis of instinct or prior experience.
For Jaspers metaphysical guilt results from confining our solidarity to the closest
human ties -- family, friends, neighbors – rather than extending it to all mankind.
It suffers from a lack of proportion. Here the parable of the Good Samaritan is
helpful because it teaches compassion for the real people we encounter rather
than the kind of abstract philanthropy which costs nothing and accomplishes
little more. The concept of metaphysical guilt can too easily be used as a
political tool by people to extort benefits from others or avoid accepting personal
responsibility.
In the end Jaspers himself acknowledges that jurisdiction over
metaphysical guilt lies with God alone. It is a disturbing and easily abused
concept but it reminds us of the subtle ways in which our lives are entangled –
and how we may unknowingly (and sometimes knowingly) profit from the
sufferings of others.

